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ABSTRACT
In the aftermath of District of Columbia v. Heller, a prominent issue
remains unresolved: whether, or to what extent, the Second Amendment
protects an individual right to keep and bear arms outside of the home. This
Article explores this unresolved issue through a newly uncovered source, the
congressional debates surrounding the District of Columbia's public carry
law in the 1890s.
These debates provide new insights into the understanding of the right
to keep and bear arms in the years following the drafting and ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Two conclusions can be drawn from the debate.
First, there was no national consensus regarding a right to public carry
under the SecondAmendment. This is important because the Supreme Court
in Heller stated that the Second Amendment "codified venerable, widely
understood liberties." Second, the Senators' and Congressmen's varied
positions on the Second Amendment and the permissible scope of public
carry regulations generally fell into regional patterns. Representatives of
states in the North and West supported a more limited public carry right,
while those representing states in the Deep South, with some exceptions,
supported a broader Second Amendment right. Because the Northern
Republicans were the ideological force behind the drafting and ratification
of the Fourteenth Amendment, their restrictive view of public carry should
be given special weight when determining the constitutionality of
contemporary public carry regulations.
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their guidance in drafting this Article. I would also like to thank the excellent team at the
Campbell Law Review for all of their aid in putting this Article together. Opinions expressed
in this Article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of
Everytown for Gun Safety.
335
1
Frassetto: The First Congressional Debate on Public Carry and What It Tells
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2018
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
INTRODUCTION .................................................. 336
I. THE FIRST CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE ON PUBLICLY CARRYING
FIREARMS............................................ 341
A. Early Public Carry Regulation in the District of
Columbia. ............................... ..... 341
B. Introduction and Quick Passage in the Senate ...... ..... 342
C. Fierce Debate and Delay in the House. ................ 344
D. Reconsideration and Ultimate Passage in the 52nd Congress 349
E. Subsequent History of Public Carry Regulation in the
District ............................. ........... 352
II. WHAT THE CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE AND PASSAGE OF THE DISTRICT'S
1892 PUBLIC CARRY LAW CAN TEACH ABOUT THE ORIGINAL
PUBLIC MEANING OF THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS INCORPORATED IN
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT .................. ..... 353
A. The Lack of a Clear National Consensus About the Scope of the
Right to Bear Arms Undermines Claims that the Second
Amendment Protects a Broad Right to Carry Firearms in
Public....................................... 354
B. When Analyzing the Scope of the Right to Bear Arms, as
Incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment, the Understanding
Adopted by the Amendment's Northern and Republican
Proponents Should Carry More Weight... ................. 356
CONCLUSION ............................................... 358
INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of District of Columbia v. Heller,' in which the
Supreme Court struck down the District of Columbia's handgun ban and
found an individual right to keep and bear arms under the Second
Amendment, a prominent issue remains unresolved: whether or to what
extent the Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear
arms outside of the home-often referred to as the right to "public carry."
This Article explores this unresolved issue through a newly uncovered
source, the congressional debates surrounding another D.C. firearm law-
the regulation of public carry-in the 1890s.
Since Heller, three public carry-related issues have arisen in Second
Amendment litigation: (1) whether the Second Amendment protects a right
to carry firearms in public at all; (2) whether the Second Amendment protects
a right to a specific kind of carry-open (a firearm exposed to public view
1. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
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in a holster) or concealed; and (3) whether it is permissible to require an
applicant for a concealed/open carry permit to make a showing of "good
cause" or a special need for self-defense to carry a firearm in public. The
Seventh Circuit and D.C. District Court have struck down total carry bans
under the Second Amendment.2 At least two courts have upheld regulations
banning open carry but allowing concealed carry.3 Several federal circuit
courts of appeals have upheld the constitutionality of requiring applicants for
carry permits to show "good cause" or a "special need" to carry a firearm,
with the D.C. Circuit being an important outlier.4 The Supreme Court has
yet to weigh in on any of these regulations.'
With minimal guidance provided by the Supreme Court, the circuit
courts have generally coalesced around a two-step test for laws regulating
firearms.6 At step one, a court analyzes whether the challenged law falls
within the scope of the Second Amendment based primarily on the text,
history, and tradition.' This step is heavily reliant on historical case law,
statutes, and treatises to make a determination whether the challenged law
falls within the historical scope of the right protected by the Second
Amendment.8 If a court finds that the law impinges on the right as
historically understood, then at step two, some form of heightened scrutiny
2. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012); Palmer v. District of Columbia, 59
F. Supp. 3d 173 (D.D.C. 2014).
3. Nichols v. Harris, 17 F. Supp. 3d 989 (C.D. Cal. 2014), argued, No. 14-55873 (9th
Cir. Feb. 15, 2018); Norman v. State, 159 So. 3d 205 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015), affd, 215
So. 3d 18 (Fla.), cert. denie4, 138 S. Ct. 469 (2017).
4. Compare Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 939 (9th Cir. 2016)
(upholding a law requiring a showing of "good cause" to obtain a concealed carry permit),
cert. denied sub nom. Peruta v. California, 137 S. Ct. 1995 (2017), Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d
426, 440 (3d Cir. 2013) (upholding a "requirement that applicants demonstrate a 'justifiable
need' to publicly carry a handgun for self-defense"), Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865,
882 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that "the good-and-substantial-reason requirement is
constitutional under the Second Amendment as applied" in this case), and Kachalsky v.
County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 101 (2d Cir. 2012) (upholding a law "limiting handgun
possession in public to those who show a special need for self-protection"), with Wrenn v.
District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 666 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (striking down a "good reason"
law).
5. The Supreme Court did obliquely address the issue of "good cause" public carry in
1894 when it stated that a person convicted under Texas's law prohibiting public carry absent
good cause was not "denied the benefit" of the right to bear arms. Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S.
535, 538 (1894). Justices Thomas and Gorsuch also issued a dissent from denial of certiorari
in Peruta v. California, indicating that they would likely strike down a good-cause issuance
regime if it reached the Court. 137 S. Ct. 1995 (2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
6. See, e.g, United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010).
7. Id at 89-90.
8. Id at 89-95.
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is applied: intermediate or strict, depending on how close the challenged law
falls to the core of the right.'
Because of this methodology, the historical understanding of the right
to keep and bear arms, as well as the historical scope of firearms regulation,
has played a prominent role in Second Amendment litigation. Unfortunately,
this history has often been mischaracterized by gun-lobby scholars in
supporting constitutional challenges to contemporary public carry
regulations. They argue that the only historical doctrinal debate surrounding
the Second Amendment was whether it protected an individual right or
pertained to a collectivist militia-based right-a legal debate which Heller
ended."o They also claim that public carry was historically unregulated
across the country and, therefore, the individual right recognized in Heller
should apply broadly outside the home." Historians and legal scholars have
recently disputed both arguments, finding instead that founding-era state
laws consistently regulated carry, while Civil War- and post-Civil War-era
state laws-and views on the scope of the Second Amendment right-varied
dramatically by region.
These findings are most clearly articulated by Saul Cornell and Eric
Ruben in an article published in the Yale Law Journal Forum, Firearm
Regionalism and Public Carry: Placing Southern Antebellum Case Law in
Context.12 Cornell and Ruben argue that, during the founding era, most states
adopted preexisting English law regulating the carrying of weapons,
specifically the Statute of Northampton, a 1328 English law that prohibited
carrying weapons in public.1 3 Many states adopted the Statute of
Northampton in their legal codes, and it was applicable through the common
9. Id at 95-96.
10. See Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2014), modifiedon
reh'g en banc, 824 F.3d 919, 939 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom. Peruta v. California,
137 S. Ct. 1995 (2017).
11. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Historians, Legal Scholars, & CRPA Foundation in
Support of Appellees and in Support of Affirmance at 14, Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864
F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (No. 15-7057) ("No State Prohibited the Public Carrying of Arms
in the Early Republic").
12. Eric Ruben & Saul Cornell, Firearm Regionalism and Public Carry: Placing
Southern Antebellum Case Law in Context, 125 YALE L.J.F. 121 (2015); see also Michael P.
O'Shea, The Second Amendment Wild Card: The Persisting Relevance of the "Hybrid"
Interpretation of the Right ofKeep and Bear Arms, 81 TENN. L. REv. 597 (2014).
13. Ruben & Cornell, supra note 12, at 128-29 (citing 1328, 2 Edw. 3 c. 3 (Eng.),
reprinted in THE STATUTES OF THE REALM 258 (Dawsons of Pall Mall 1963) (1810)); see
Patrick J. Charles, The Faces of the Second Amendment Outside the Home: History Versus
Ahistorical Standards ofReview, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 1 (2012); Patrick J. Charles, The Faces
of the Second Amendment Outside the Home, Take Two: How We Got Here and Why It
Matters, 64 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 373 (2016).
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law in other states.14 While there is some debate as to the scope of the
prohibition under the Statute of Northampton and its progeny, no credible
scholar from either side of the debate disputes that the Northampton
formulation governed public carry during the period."
By the 1830s, this national uniformity had broken down, and at least
two regional traditions developed, according to Cornell and Ruben." The
"Massachusetts model," common in the North and Midwest, prohibited
carrying firearms in public generally, with an exception for those with a
specific reason to fear for their safety." In the Deep South, an alternative
tradition developed, which allowed open carry but prohibited concealed
carry.18 After the Civil War, a third tradition developed in the Western states,
which prohibited carry completely in populated cities and towns but allowed
carry with no restrictions in the lawless rural frontier. 19 The Massachusetts
14. See Act of Mar. 15, 1821, ch. 76, § 1, 1821 Me. Laws 285, 285; Act of Nov. 1, 1692,
ch. 18, § 6, 1692-93 Mass. Acts 51, 52-53; Acts of Apr. 6-19, 1686, ch. 9, in AARON
LEAMING & JACOB SPICER, THE GRANTS, CONCESSIONS, AND ORIGINAL CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
PROVINCE OF NEW JERSEY 283, 289-90 (2d ed., Phila., W. Bradford 1881); Acts of Mar. 1-28,
1682, ch. 18, in THE GRANTS, CONCESSIONS, AND ORIGINAL CONSTITUTIONS OF THE PROVINCE
OF NEW JERSEY, supra, at 227,250; 1328,2 Edw. 3 c. 3 (Eng.), reprintedin FRANCOlS-XAVIER
MARTIN, A COLLECTION OF THE STATUTES OF THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND IN FORCE IN THE
STATE OF NORTH-CAROLINA 60-61 (Newbern, N.C., 1792) (indicating North Carolina's
adoption of England's public carry prohibition); Act of Nov. 13, 1801, ch. 22, § 6, 1715-1820
Tenn. Laws 708, 710; An Act Forbidding and Punishing Affrays, ch. 49, 1786 Va. Laws 35,
35.
15. See Brief of Amici Curiae Historians, Legal Scholars, & CRPA Foundation in
Support of Appellees and in Support of Affirmance, supra note 11.
16. Ruben & Cornell, supra note 12, at 132.
17. See ME. STAT. tit. 12, ch. 169, § 16 (1841); MASS. REV. STAT. ch. 134, § 16 (1836);
MICH. REv. STAT. ch. 162, § 16 (1846); MINN. REV. STAT. ch. 112, § 18 (1851); OR. REV.
STAT. ch. 16, § 17 (1853); Act of Mar. 31, 1860, no. 375, § 6, 1860 Pa. Laws 427, 432; Act
of Mar. 14, 1848, ch. 14 § 16, 1848 Va. Acts 93, 129; Act of July 4, 1839, § 16, 1839 Wis.
Sess. Laws 379, 381.
18. See ALA. CODE §§ 3273-3275 (1852); GA. CODE § 4413 (1861).
19. See Act of Mar. 18, 1889, no. 13, 1889 Ariz. Sess. Laws 30; Act of Feb. 4, 1889, § 1,
1889 Idaho Sess. Laws 23, 23 (struck down by Inre Brickey, 70 P. 609 (Idaho 1902), a curious
case worthy of further discussion in another venue); Act of Jan. 29, 1869, ch. 32, § 1, 1869
N.M. Laws 72, 72; Act of Dec. 2, 1875, ch. 52, § 1, 1876 Wyo. Sess. Laws 352, 352. Many
localities, especially those in the frontier West, passed their own public carry laws. See L.A.,
CAL., ORDINANCES AND RESOLUTIONS §§ 35-36 (1878); WICHITA, KAN., ORDINANCES no.
1641, §§ 1-4 (1900); SALINA, KAN., ORDINANCES no. 268 (1879); NEB. CITY, NEB., LAWS,
ORDINANCES, AND RULES no. 7 (1872); Checotah, Okla., Ordinance 11, § 3 (Oct. 29, 1898);
McKINNEY, TEx., REV. ORDINANCES no. 20 (1899); Dall., Tex., Ordinance Prohibiting and
Punishing the Unlawful Carrying of Arms (July 18, 1887); RAWLINS, Wyo., ORDINANCES art.
7(1893).
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model also moved into some Deep South and border states during this time
period.2 0
The congressional debates discussed in this Article, which occurred
surrounding the consideration and passage of a public carry law for the
District of Columbia, further support the Cornell-Ruben position in two
ways. First, they show no national consensus existed regarding a right to
public carry under the Second Amendment. Some, especially in the Deep
South, believed the Second Amendment required a broad right to open carry,
others thought carry could be limited to situations where a person
experienced a particular need for self-defense, and some did not believe the
Second Amendment protected any individual right to carry in public at all.
Because the Supreme Court in Heller stated that the Second Amendment
"codified venerable, widely understood liberties," this lack of consensus
casts doubt on the claims of gun-lobby scholars that a permissive public carry
regime is constitutionally mandated.21
Second, the senators' and congressmen's varied positions on the
Second Amendment and the permissible scope of public carry regulations
generally fell into regional patterns. Representatives of states in the North
and West supported a more limited public carry right, while those
representing states in the Deep South, with some exceptions, supported a
broader Second Amendment right. Because the Northern Republicans were
the ideological force behind the drafting and ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, through which the Second Amendment applies to the states,
their restrictive view of public carry should be given special weight when
determining the constitutionality of contemporary public carry regulations.2 2
In contrast, the Southern Democrats' views should not be controlling, as their
legal traditions were in direct opposition to the principles driving the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Section L.A of this Article surveys the history of public carry regulation
in the District of Columbia from its founding to 1890. Section I.B discusses
20. See Act of Apr. 1, 1881, no. 96, § 1, 1881 Ark. Acts 191, 191; Act of Dec. 14, 1871,
ch. 90, § 1, 1871 Tenn. Acts 81, 81; 1879 Tex. Crim. Stat. 318 (enacted Apr. 12, 1871); W.
VA. CODE ch. 153, § 8 (1870). For an explanation of how this occurred in Texas, see Mark
Anthony Frassetto, The Law and Politics ofFirearms Regulation in Reconstruction Texas, 4
TEx. A&M L. REv. 95 (2016).
21. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 605 (2008).
22. This is not a completely uncontroversial view. The compelled passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment by at least six Southern states was necessary for the Amendment's
eventual ratification. That being said, Northern Republicans were clearly the primary force
behind the drafting and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, and to the extent Southern
states participated in ratification, it was on terms dictated by the Northern states. See
Christopher R. Green, Loyal Denominatorism and the Fourteenth Amendment: Normative
Defense and Implications, 13 DuKE J. CONST. L. & PuB. POL'Y 167 (2018).
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the introduction of a bill in the 51st Congress to increase the punishment for
carrying a weapon in the District and the Senate debate associated with the
bill. Section I.C examines the corresponding debate in the House of
Representatives. Section I.D discusses consideration of the bill in the 52nd
Congress, focusing on the debate in the Senate immediately preceding the
bill's ultimate passage. Section I.E reviews the subsequent history of public
carry regulation in the District from the 1890s to the present. Part H analyzes
what the debate and passage of the District's 1892 public carry law can teach
us about the contemporary debate surrounding the original meaning of the
Second Amendment, as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment.
I. THE FIRST CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE ON PUBLICLY CARRYING
FIREARMS
A. Early Public Carry Regulation in the District of Columbia
Since its creation, the District of Columbia has regulated the carrying
of firearms in public. From 1791 to 1857, the District operated under the
Statute of Northampton, a general prohibition on public carry, which it
inherited from Maryland as common law.2 3 In 1857, the City Council for the
City of Washington passed an ordinance prohibiting public carry, essentially
codifying the existing common law ban.24 The following year, the ordinance
was amended to specifically include concealed carry.25 Meanwhile, the City
of Georgetown, which had its own local government during that time period,
had also enacted a public carry ban at some earlier point.26 Also in 1857, an
effort was made to codify and standardize the laws of the District as a whole,
given that the District had three separate government entities at the time: the
City of Washington, the City of Georgetown, and the County of
Washington.2 7 The final product of this effort included a Massachusetts
23. D.C. CODE § 40 (1819) (Noting the continued application of the Statute of
Northampton in Washington, D.C.). Upon its creation, the District adopted the laws of
Maryland within the portion ceded by Maryland and the laws of Virginia within the portion
ceded from Virginia (present-day Arlington and Alexandria counties). Act of Feb. 27, 1801,
ch. 15, § 1, 2 Stat. 103, 103-05.
24. Act of Nov. 4, 1857, ch. 5, in GENERAL LAWS OF THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF
WASHINGTON 75 (Robert A. Waters ed., 1860).
25. Act of Nov. 18, 1858, ch. 11, in GENERAL LAWS OF THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY
OF WASHINGTON, supra note 24, at 114.
26. See generally A Resolution for the Relief of] Hammersleig, EVENING STAR (D.C.),
July 7, 1860, at 3 (reporting the remission of a fine imposed for carrying a deadly weapon).
27. See D.C. Organic Act of 1871, ch. 62, 16 Stat. 419 (revoking the charters of the cities
of Georgetown and Washington and creating a single government entity in the District of
Columbia).
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model law, which would have banned carry except in cases of special need;
but because of reasons unrelated to firearms, a referendum to adopt the code
failed.2 8
In 1871, the three District governments merged. The newly unified
District government passed an ordinance identical to the one enacted by the
City of Washington in 1858.29 The ordinance made it a crime for persons in
the District "to carry or have concealed about their persons any deadly or
dangerous weapons."3 0 Violations of the law resulted in forfeiture of the
weapons and fines ranging from $20 to $50 (about $500 to $1,200 today,
adjusted for inflation).'
In 1890, after repeated public calls for a harsher penalty for carrying
dangerous weapons, the District Attorney of the District of Columbia sent a
request to Congress seeking legislation to increase the severity of the
sanction for carrying dangerous weapons.3 2 That request resulted in the first
congressional debate on public carry regulation-one that dragged on for
several years and pitted Northern Republicans in favor of regulation against
Southern Democrats who opposed it.3 3 The following sections describe that
debate and its ramifications for understanding the historical scope of the
Second Amendment.
B. Introduction and Quick Passage in the Senate
On March 14, 1890, Senator Charles Faulkner of West Virginia
introduced a bill "to punish the carrying or selling of deadly or dangerous
weapons within the District of Columbia." 3 4 The proposed legislation made
28. See Georgetown Affairs, EVENNG STAR (D.C.), Feb. 16, 1858, at 3; see also D.C.
CODE ANN., at XVII, XX (1973).
29. See D.C. Organic Act; see also D.C. CODE ch. 16, § 119 (1894) (enacted July 20,
1871).
30. D.C. CODE ch. 16, § 119.
31. Id.; see also 21 CONG. REc. 4448 (1890). Whether the 1871 law covered all carry or
only concealed carry is an issue of debate in current Second Amendment litigation. The law
made it a crime "to carry or have concealed about their persons any deadly or dangerous
weapons," and later stated, "and any person or persons who shall be duly convicted of so
carrying or having concealed about their persons any such weapons shall forfeit." D.C. CODE
ch. 16, § 119.
32. See 21 CONG. REc. 4448 (1890) (statement of Sen. Ingalls).
33. Congress had addressed firearm regulation in debates during Reconstruction in the
context of challenging discriminatory "Black Codes," passed in the South, specifically
prohibiting freedmen from carrying firearms. See Stephen P. Halbrook, Heller, the Second
Amendment, and Reconstruction: Protecting All Freedmen or Only Militiamen?, 50 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 1073, 1075 (2010). However, Congress had not addressed firearm regulation
through its own law enforcement powers before 1890.
34. 21 CONG. REc. 2225 (1890).
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it illegal for any person "to have concealed about their person any deadly or
dangerous weapons, such as daggers, air guns, pistols, bowie knives, dirk
knives or dirks, blackjacks, razors, razor blades, sword canes, slung shots,
brass or other metal knuckles" and "to carry openly any such weapon ...
with intent to unlawfully use the same." 35 Violations of the proposed law
would result in forfeiture of the weapons, fines of up to $200 (about $5,500
today, adjusted for inflation), and up to six months' imprisonment.36 A
second violation under the law called for one-to-three years in prison.3 7 The
law also prohibited the transfer of firearms to those under the age of twenty-
one and made such transfers punishable by up to a $100 fine ($2,250 today,
adjusted for inflation) and three months in jail.38  The legislation only
exempted law enforcement officers, members of the military, and militia
members.
The bill initially moved quickly; it was reported out of the Senate
Committee on the District of Columbia in only two weeks.40 On May 10,
1890, the full Senate debated the bill and passed an amendment to ensure the
law would not be over-interpreted to prevent individuals from carrying
weapons in their own homes or places of business or from carrying weapons
to and from their place of purchase or a gunsmith.4 1 Only one Senator,
Joseph Dolph of Oregon, spoke in opposition to the amendment. He claimed
the amendment was unnecessary because "every man and boy in the whole
city can carry any one of these weapons under this section, if it is carried
openly and with the intention of using it for a lawful purpose, that is, for self-
defense." 4 2  Senator Dolph presumably interpreted the original bill as
banning concealed carry altogether but permitting open carry for lawful
purposes. This is a plausible reading, but it is unclear if other senators
35. Local Legislation, EVENING STAR (D.C.), Dec. 9, 1890, at 3.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id
39. Id.
40. 21 CONG. REC. 2741 (1890).
41. Id. at 4448. The amendment read:
Provided further, [t]hat nothing contained in the first or second sections of this act
shall be so construed as to prevent any person from keeping or carrying about his
place of business, dwelling house, or premises any such dangerous or deadly
weapon, or from carrying the same from place of purchase to his dwelling house or
place of business or from his dwelling house or place of business to any place where
repairing is done, to have the same repaired, and back again.
Id. While an amendment of this kind might seem like over-legislating, there were examples
of prosecutions under concealed carry bans for carrying firearms concealed within one's
home. See, e.g, Owen v. State, 31 Ala. 387 (1858).
42. 21 CONG. REc. 4448 (1890) (statement of Sen. Dolph).
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interpreted the open carry provision of the bill so expansively, as the bill as
amended passed without further revision or debate.43
C. Fierce Debate and Delay in the House
On May 12, 1890, passage by the Senate was reported to the House, and
the bill was referred to the House Committee on the District of Columbia.4
The House moved less expeditiously than the Senate; the bill was not
reported out of committee until four months later on September 19, 1890.45
On December 8, 1890, Congressman William Grout, a Republican from
Vermont and Chairman of the Committee on the District of Columbia,
presented the bill to the full House.46 The ensuing debate, which was much
more robust than in the Senate, showed the sharp divide between the states
on the constitutionality and wisdom of regulating public carry.
Congressman James Blount, a Democrat Confederate Army veteran
from Georgia,4 7 most vehemently opposed the bill.4 8 Blount's opposition
stemmed from his belief that the bill banned both open and concealed carry
altogether, which casts doubt on the conflicting interpretation of Senator
Dolph, discussed above. Blount stated:
I submit that it is certainly an infringement of the right of any citizen to
undertake by law to say to him that "if you carry these weapons secretly you
are liable to indictment and if you carry them openly you are liable to
indictment," because it amounts to saying that he shall not carry them at all.49
Blount's position was that a total carry ban violated the Second Amendment
but that a concealed carry ban that permitted open carry would be acceptable:
"It does seem to me, Mr. Speaker, that the restraint that he shall carry it
openly is a sufficient safeguard to allow the citizen the privilege which the
Constitution undoubtedly gives to him."5 o
43. Id
44. Id at 4572; id at 4685.
45. Id at 10,270.
46. 22 CONG. REc. 223 (1890) (statement of Rep. Grout). Congressman Grout presenting
the law is a bit ironic, as Vermont, then as now, had no law regulating the public carry of
firearms.
47. John S. Whitehead, James Blount (1837-1903), NEw GA. ENCYCLOPEDIA (Jan. 28,
2013), https://perma.cc/MY96-RWR8. Blount was an attorney and plantation owner prior to
the Civil War and served in the Confederate Army before being wounded and returning to his
legal practice and plantation. Id He was a leading Georgia Redeemer and was elected to
Congress after Reconstruction ended in Georgia. Id
48. See 22 CONG. REc. 223-25 (1890).
49. Id at 224 (statement of Rep. Blount).
50. Id
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This view was consistent with the antebellum-era constitutional
decisions of the Georgia Supreme Court-Blount's home state-which had
rejected the state legislature's attempts to prohibit carry altogether and
instead limited the legislature to regulating the manner of carry.s1 In fact,
Blount was almost certainly referring to this and other Georgia court
decisions when he stated that "the courts have required that the weapons
should be carried openly and that there was no infringement where they were
carried openly."52 Blount acknowledged that his view was inconsistent with
that in other regions of the country, noting "the gentleman [presumably
Congressman Grout, the bill's sponsor] tells us that such legislation has met
the approval of the older and more civilized States and the larger cities
throughout the country." 53 However, Blount maintained his position that
"the Constitution designed that a person might carry weapons wherever he
pleased; that it was a right which could not be infringed."54
Next to speak was Congressman Benjamin Enloe, a Democrat from
Tennessee, who also opposed the bill but in a much narrower manner. Like
Blount, he accepted the bill's prohibition on concealed carry but rejected a
complete carry ban under the Second Amendment.55 Unlike Blount, he
believed the bill would have passed constitutional muster had it permitted
open carry of only weapons used in warfare.56 Enloe stated:
I think the right to bear arms, as defined by the Constitution, has been clearly
settled to be the right to bear only such arms as are used in warfare, and that
the manner of carrying them may be regulated by statute. This bill does not
meet the requirements of the case and should be amended.
Enloe's position was consistent with the view of the Supreme Court of
Tennessee, his home state.
Congressman Roger Mills, a Democratic Confederate Army veteran
from Texas, next spoke to reject Congressman Enloe's narrower view of the
Second Amendment right.59 Mills backed Blount's position and, in fact,
referenced a Georgia Supreme Court decision in doing so:
[I]n the old courts, where the old men presided who helped to found the
Government, it was held that th[e] right was without any limitation whatever.
One of the ablest decisions ever rendered in any court in this Union was
51. See Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846).
52. 22 CONG. REc. 225 (1890) (statement of Rep. Blount).
53. Id. at 224.
54. Id at 225.
55. Id. at 224 (statement of Rep. Enloe).
56. Id. at 225.
57. Id.
58. See Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165 (1871).
59. 22 CoNG. REc. 225 (1890) (statement of Rep. Mills).
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rendered by Judge Lumpkin, of Georgia, in a case in which a citizen was
indicted under the laws of that State for carrying a pistol, and the same
argument was made that I have heard mentioned here to-day, that the
language of the Constitution had reference to military weapons, but that
judge held, in accordance with the terms of the Constitution, that the State
government of Georgia had no power to infringe the right of the citizen to
carry whatever character of arms he pleased in defense of his person.60
Unlike Blount and Enloe, Mills's position differed from the law of Texas,
his home state. At the time, Texas prohibited public carry, with an exception
for open carry when a person faced an imminent threat. 6 1 The Texas
Supreme Court had repeatedly and decisively upheld the law.62
Interestingly, other than the reference to the Georgia court decision, Mills's
criticism of the Texas law and proposed D.C. bill was based not on
constitutional concerns but practical ones-namely, the standard refrain of
the gun lobby that good guys with guns are needed to stop bad guys with
guns.6 Mills asserted:
What is the effect of [Texas's carry] law? My own State has a similar
provision [to the Second Amendment] in its constitution, and you may pick
up a paper almost any day and see where the law has been violated, and
sometimes life is taken by these arms which are prohibited from being borne,
but which are still carried by men whose home is on a horse, who have no
property, who have no home, who have nothing to fix them upon any spot
on the earth. They can defy the law at pleasure; but the man who can not
afford to go to jail, the man who has some reputation at stake, the man who
has a family and a home and character, must obey the law and allow his life
to be endangered and the security of his person to be violated because the
law will not permit him to defend himself. These laws are all unwise. You
can not increase the security of the people by disarming the law-abiding
element of the country and permitting men who persistently defy the laws to
carry arms and take the lives of their fellow-citizens. 64
60. Id. (referring to Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846)); see also Cockrum v. State, 24
Tex. 394, 402 (1859) ("The right of a citizen to bear arms, in the lawful defense of himself or
the state, is absolute.").
61. 1879 Tex. Crim. Stat. 318 (enacted Apr. 12, 1871).
62. See Frassetto, supra note 20, at 113-18.
63. See Nunn, 1 Ga. 243.
64. 22 CONG. REc. 225 (1890) (statement of Rep. Mills). It should not be surprising that
Mills opposed his own state's law. It was passed during Reconstruction by Radical
Republican Governor Edmund J. Davis in an effort to reduce racial violence against freedmen.
See Frassetto, supra note 20, at 101. Mills was a political opponent of Davis during the
Reconstruction period and achieved his place in Congress upon the collapse of Republican
control in Texas. Roger Quarles Mills of Corsicana, Navarro County, Texas, NAVARRO
CouNTY TEx. GENEALOGICAL & HIsT. WEBSITE, https://perma.cc/9WCD-93AF.
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Congressman John Rogers, a Democrat from Arkansas who became a
federal district court judge six years later, rejected Mills's arguments.
Rogers felt that a complete carry ban was appropriate: "My own mind, my
own judgment, from an experience in the Western country in turbulent times,
leads me to believe that this is a proper subject of legislation, and that there
should be police regulation of the carrying of concealed weapons."' Like
the other members of Congress (Mills notwithstanding), Rogers's view of
the Second Amendment closely followed the legal tradition of his home
state, which had adopted a strictly militia-based view of the right and did not
recognize a right to carry.66 Rogers went so far as to propose new language
for the bill:
I would suggest the provision which is contained in the statute of our State
[Arkansas], prohibiting the carrying of these things at all as weapons. We
prohibit a man from carrying any of these things as a weapon at all. We hold
that he has no business to go with his little pistol stuck in his breeches pocket
walking about the streets waiting to get into a difficulty, whether by his own
fault or by the fault of someone else. I think that provision ought to be
adopted here, because if the object of this bill is a proper one the law should
be made effective. 67
Congressman Grout, the bill's sponsor, supported the proposal, responding:
"So far as I am personally concerned I do not object to the language
suggested by the gentleman from Arkansas. I think it would be perhaps as
good as that used in the bill.""
While most of the debate featured Southern Democrats, who
themselves did not present a monolithic front, some Northern Republicans
also weighed in. Pennsylvania Republican Congressman Marriot Brosius
suggested the bill be amended to adopt Pennsylvania's law, which prohibited
65. 22 CONG. REc. 225-26 (1890) (statement of Rep. Rogers).
66. See Haile v. State, 38 Ark. 564 (1882); Fife v. State, 31 Ark. 455 (1876); State v.
Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 (1842).
67. 22 CONG. REc. 226 (1890) (statement of Rep. Rogers). It is unclear whether
Congressman Rogers was correct about the status of Arkansas law. The author's
understanding is that the law in Arkansas was similar to that in Tennessee, requiring a person
to carry weapons openly in the hand. Compare Act of Dec. 14, 1871, ch. 90, § 1, 1871 Tenn.
Acts 81, 81, with Act of Apr. 1, 1881, no. 96, § 1, 1881 Ark. Acts 191, 191. That being said,
Arkansas precedent had made clear that there was no right to publicly carry a firearm or other
weapon. See Buzzard, 4. Ark. 18. It is certainly possible that Arkansas's law was understood
as a total ban on carry because of the extremely unusual and burdensome method required to
carry.
68. 22 CONG. REc. 226 (1890) (statement of Rep. Grout). This offhand comment is
interesting because Vermont had no law regulating public carry. While it would be wrong to
draw any real conclusions from it, Grout's comment suggests that this hands-off treatment of
public carry stemmed from public carry simply not being a problem in the tightly knit rural
state.
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carrying a concealed weapon when carried with the "intent therewith
unlawfully and maliciously to do injury to any other person" and allowed the
jury to infer the intention to do injury from the fact the pistol was carried in
a concealed manner. 6 9 Practically speaking, Pennsylvania's law functioned
as a total ban on concealed carry.
Meanwhile, Congressman Charles Grosvenor, a Republican attorney
and Union Army veteran from Ohio, took a position consistent with the
Massachusetts model and his home state's treatment of concealed carry.
He suggested that the bill as drafted would violate the Second Amendment
if it did not include an exception for when a person faced a specific threat.
Grosvenor stated:
Now, it is proposed to make it a penitentiary offense and felony to carry a
pistol, no matter for what purpose. I do not believe that such a statute can be
enforced under the Constitution of the United States. I do not believe that
the provision in the Constitution of the United States ever intended, nor has
there ever been a construction of a court put upon it, that, in order that I may
be allowed to defend myself against a threatened assault, I shall be compelled
to carry a cannon, a musket, or a saber; and the whole question must be put
71in such a shape that it shall apply to unlawful carrying.
In response to Grosvenor's concerns, Congressman Grout brought forward
an amendment from Congressman Samuel Lanham, a Democrat and veteran
of the Confederate Army from Texas.72 Lanham's proposal, which mirrored
Texas's public carry statute, allowed for the carrying of firearms when a
person had "reasonable ground[s] for fearing an unlawful attack" and did not
have time for law enforcement to intervene.7 3
Lanham strongly supported the D.C. bill with his amendment based on
his experience with Texas's public carry law. Lanham stated:
Mr. Speaker, the amendment which I have proposed is in the exact terms
of the statute of my State inhibiting the unlawful carrying of arms so far as
it relates to the question of bearing arms in self-defense, and that statute has
operated most successfully in the State of Texas, so that to-day our laws
against carrying arms are as well and thoroughly enforced as perhaps
anywhere in this American Union.
Now, I am in favor, Mr. Speaker, of the general purpose of this bill, and
believe that, with the amendment proposed, it will substantially accomplish
69. Id. at 227.
70. See Act of Mar. 18, 1859, 1859 Ohio Laws 56.
71. 22 CONG. REc. 228-29 (1890) (statement of Rep. Grosvenor).
72. Lanham, Samuel Willis Tucker, (1846-1908), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE U.S.
CoNGREss 1774-PRESENT, https://perma.cc/PP7S-UPJF.
73. 22 CONG. REc. 229 (1890) (statement of Rep. Lanham).
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the end intended as well as sufficiently guard the rights of the citizen. The
courts in my State have construed the provision of the Constitution which I
have read, as well as the statute from which I have quoted, and nowhere in
their decisions is it denied that the State has the authority to regulate the
carrying of weapons and enforce the same by suitable penalties. In order to
bring about proper conditions of law and good order, it has been found
necessary in that State to adopt the statute which I have read. Its
constitutionally has been judicially affirmed, and to-day, as I have said, its
operations are successful and satisfactory. 4
Lanham's view contrasted sharply with that of his Texas colleague
Congressman Mills but, as evidenced by Lanham's own statement, was
consistent with Texas practice and case law. 5
The differing views from this single day of debate in the House
showcase the widely divergent understanding of the Second Amendment in
the wake of the Civil War.76 While Southern Democrats voiced the strongest
opposition to the restrictions on public carry, even they were split as to the
proper scope of the Second Amendment in that context.77 Congressman
Mills's testimony, in particular, suggests that the opposition was not always
motivated by constitutional concerns and was instead based on practical
concerns that not everyone shared (e.g., Congressman Lanham).
What is clear from the 1890 House debate is that reconciliation of the
varying views was a difficult task. In fact, rather than attempt to piece
together the various proposals, Congressman Grout instead recommitted the
D.C. carry bill to the Committee on the District of Columbia, where it died
for the session.
D. Reconsideration and Ultimate Passage in the 52nd Congress
On December 16, 1891, Senator Faulkner introduced a new D.C. carry
bill in the 52nd Congress.79 The bill was identical to the prior version but
included an amendment similar to Congressman Lanham's earlier proposal
allowing judges to issue licenses to carry firearms if an applicant could make
a showing of necessity.80 The amendment provided for the issuance of one-
month carry permits "upon satisfactory proof to [ajudge] of the necessity for
the granting thereof' and upon the filing of a bond that would be forfeited if
74. Id
75. See Frassetto, supra note 20.
76. See supra notes 46-66 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text; notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
78. 22 CONG. REc. 230 (1890) (statement of Rep. Grout). The bill was reported out of
committee but never saw action on the floor. H.R REP. No. 51-3293 (1890).
79. 23 CONG. REc. 69 (1891).
80. Act of July 13, 1892, ch. 159, § 2, 27 Stat. 116, 116-17 (1893).
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the permittee used the firearm "save in the case of necessary self-defense."8 1
On January 18, 1892, the bill was reported out of the Senate Committee on
the District of Columbia.82 On February 11, 1892, the bill came to the floor
of the Senate, where it passed with little debate.
The bill was then reported to the House and again assigned to the
Committee on the District of Columbia.84 On April 21, 1892, the Committee
reported out H.R. 8294 as a substitute for the Senate bill, which was virtually
identical to the Senate bill.85 In contrast to the previous session's intense
debate, the 1892 bill, despite being quite similar to the controversial 1890
bill, passed the House without debate. 86
The House bill was then reported to the Senate, where it passed out of
the Committee on the District of Columbia without amendment." On July
6, 1892, the bill came up for debate. The bill faced criticism on two fronts.
First, Democratic Senator Edward White of Louisiana objected to the
amendment that allowed judges to issue permits to carry firearms. 89 Senator
White claimed the licensing regime granted magistrates "unlimited
discretion."9 0 White instead favored a flat ban on publicly carrying firearms,
with no exceptions.9 1
Second, Texas Senator Roger Mills, who had achieved elevation to the
Senate in the 1890 election, renewed the criticisms of the law he had
espoused two years earlier while a member of the House of
Representatives.92 Mills again claimed virtually any regulation on publicly
carrying firearms eviscerated the right protected by the Second
Amendment. Mills attacked the law, saying while it was intended to
"secure the person of the citizen, [it] result[ed] in rendering him more
8 1. Id
82. 23 CONG. REc. 355 (1892).
83. Id at 1050-51.
84. Id at 1095.
85. Id at 3510. Compare S. 1060, 52d Cong. (as amended on Jan. 18, 1892), with H.R.
8294, 52d Cong. (1892).
86. 23 CONG. REC. 5253 (1892). This may have been in part because Congressman Mills
had been elected to the Senate.
87. Id at 5486.
88. Id at 5788.
89. Id (statement of Sen. White).
90. Id
91. Id
92. Id. (statement of Sen. Mills); Roger Quarles Mills of Corsicana, Navarro County,
Texas, supra note 64.
93. 23 CONG. REc. 5788 (1892) (statement of Sen. Mills).
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insecure." 94 Mills, who was a prominent Redeemer, 9 5 then stated without
apparent irony that he would "never vote in this or any other legislative
assembly for the deprivation of any citizen of a single natural right that he
has, if I know it, and his right to defend himself is one of the rights with
which he is invested by his Maker."96
Senator Edward Wolcott, a Republican from Colorado, Union veteran
of the Civil War, and graduate of Harvard Law School, rejected Mills's
interpretation of the Second Amendment. Wolcott stated:
In reference to what was said by the Senator from Texas [Mr. MILLS] I do
not know except by the public press how the law permitting the carrying of
weapons generally operates down in Texas, but I do know that in our cities
of the North there is no law which serves so much in the interests of justice
and the police power and the preservation of the public peace as acts which
prohibit the carrying of concealed weapons. The constitutional provision is
not affected by such a law. This bill is intended to apply to the criminal
classes in the alleys of Washington who carry razors in their pockets, who
carry concealed weapons, and brass knuckles. It is intended to reach them,
and it is not intended to affect the constitutional right of any citizen who
desires to obey the law.
For my part, I think it is a very late day for anybody to claim that under the
provisions of the Constitution of the United States we have no right to enact
a law which shall prohibit assassins and thugs from carrying concealed
weapons. Bearing arms and carrying concealed weapons are very different
things.98
Senator Wolcott's view ultimately prevailed. Senator White's motion
to remove the licensing provision from the bill was rejected by a voice vote.99
The bill then passed by a margin of 34 to 13 (41 not voting), with
Republicans, Northerners, and those from states with strong public carry
laws generally supporting, and Democrats from states with weak carry laws
generally opposing.oo The only Republican who opposed the measure was
94. Id
95. Redeemers were white Democrats, often Confederate veterans of the Civil War, who
seized power in the South at the end of Reconstruction. See generally ERIc FONER,
RECONSTRUCTION 587 (Henry Steele Commager & Richard B. Morris eds., 1988).
96. 23 CONG. REc. 5788 (1892) (statement of Sen. Mills).
97. Wolcott, Edward Oliver, (1848-1905), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE U.S.
CoNGREss 1774-PRESENT, https://permacc/Y3QS-M3J5.
98. 23 CONG. REc. 5789 (1892) (statement of Sen. Wolcott).
99. Id at 5789.
100. Id at 5790. Supporting: Aldrich (R.I. Rep.), Allen (Wash. Rep.), Allison (Iowa
Rep.), Berry (Ark. Dem.), Cameron (Pa. Rep.), Carey (Wyo. Rep.), Chandler (N.H. Rep.),
Cockrell (Mo. Dem.), Cullom (Ill. Rep.), Davis (Minn. Rep.), Dolph (Or. Rep.), Dubois
(Idaho Rep.), Felton (Cal. Rep.), Frye (Me. Rep.), Gallinger (N.H. Rep.), Hansbrough (N.D.
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Orville H. Platt from Connecticut, the heart of the gun manufacturing
industry at the time. On July 13, 1892, President Benjamin Harrison signed
the bill into law.1 01
E. Subsequent History ofPublic Carry Regulation in the District
The District's public carry law would remain generally the same for the
next eighty-five years, with minor revisions enacted in 1932 and 1943.102
During this time, there were numerous prosecutions under the law, none of
which resulted in the law's constitutionality being challenged. 103 In 1976,
the District completely banned the registration of new handguns, although it
technically still allowed the issuance of concealed carry permits for
grandfathered firearms. 104 The Supreme Court struck down the handgun ban
in its Heller decision in 2008.105 In the wake of Heller, the District modified
its firearms regulations to allow the sale of new handguns but to prohibit the
issuance of carry permits altogether.1 06 In 2014, a federal district court struck
down this prohibition.1 0 7 Following that decision, the District revised its
Rep.), Harris (Tenn. Dem.), Higgins (Del. Rep.), Hunton (Va. Dem.), Jones (Ark. Dem.), Kyle
(S.D. Prog.), McMillan (Mich. Rep.), Manderson (Neb. Rep.), Paddock (Neb. Rep.),
Pettigrew (S.D. Rep.), Proctor (Vt. Rep.), Quay (Pa. Rep.), Sawyer (Wis. Rep.), Shoup (Idaho
Rep.), Stockbridge (Mich. Rep.), Vilas (Wis. Dem.), Warren (Wyo. Rep.), Washburn (Minn.
Rep.), Wolcott (Colo. Rep.). Id Opposing: Bate (Tenn. Dem.), Call (Fla. Dem.), Coke (Tex.
Dem.), Daniel (Va. Dem.), Gorman (Md. Dem.), Gray (Del. Dem.), Mills (Tex. Dem.), Platt
(Conn. Rep.), Turpie (Ind. Dem.), Vest (Mo. Dem.), Voorhees (Ind. Dem.), Walthall (Miss.
Dem.), White (La. Dem.). Id For state and party affiliations, see W.H. MICHAEL, OFFICIAL
CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY: FIFTY-SECOND CONGRESS (2d ed. 1892).
101. See Act of July 13, 1892, ch. 159, 27 Stat. 116 (1893).
102. See Act of July 8, 1932, ch. 465, § 4, 47 Stat. 650, 651; Act of Nov. 4, 1943, ch. 296,
57 Stat. 586.
103. See, e.g, Flourisheda Revolver, EVENING STAR (D.C.), Jan. 9, 1895, at 10 (reporting
that a man was sentenced to four months in jail for displaying a revolver and using "reckless
language"); Local News of All Sorts, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1894, at 6 (reporting that two
men were sentenced to 180 days injail for "carrying deadly weapons"); Concealed Weapons
Case, MORNING TIMEs (D.C.), June 20, 1896, at 2 (reporting that a man was sentenced to a
fine of fifty dollars or six months in jail for carrying a slung shot).
104. See 23 D.C. Reg. 2464 (Oct. 1, 1976); Firearms Control Regulations Act of 1975, 23
D.C. Reg. 1091 (July 23, 1976); see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 574-
75 (2008).
105. Heller, 554 U.S. at 636.
106. D.C. CODE § 22-4504 (West, Westlaw through 2009 legislation), invalidated by
Palmer v. District of Columbia, 59 F. Supp. 3d 173 (D.D.C. 2014).
107. Palmer, 59 F. Supp. 3d at 182-83.
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public carry law yet again-this time, banning open carry altogether and
permitting concealed carry only upon a showing of special need. 108
In essence, the District went full circle and reverted to the 1892
framework. Gun lobby lawyers challenged this revised version of D.C.'s
public carry law.1 09 The revised version of the law was then struck down by
the D.C. Circuit in Wrenn v. District of Columbia as violative of the Second
Amendment.110 The District's application for en banc review was denied,
and the attorney general and mayor decided not to pursue the case to the
Supreme Court.' After Wrenn, D.C. is left with a licensing system
requiring training and an in-depth background check but generally allowing
any applicant without a serious 'criminal record or history of severe mental
illness to get a license to carry a concealed firearm. 112
H1. WHAT THE CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE AND PASSAGE OF THE
DISTRICT'S 1892 PUBLIC CARRY LAW CAN TEACH ABOUT THE ORIGINAL
PUBLIC MEANING OF THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS INCORPORATED IN THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
The debate surrounding whether the Second Amendment protects a
right to carry guns in public is one of the most contentious in the legal field,
so it is important not to overstate the significance of the materials presented
in this- Article. That being said, the history of public carry regulation in
Washington, D.C. and the debate surrounding congressional passage of the
1892 law support two important conclusions. The first, and what should be
a non-controversial conclusion, is that in the wake of the Civil War and
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, there was not a clear national
consensus about how, and even if, the Second Amendment applied to the
carrying of firearms in public. Consistent with the Cornell-Ruben model,
there was a geographic and political split in ideology about firearms that
generally resulted in Democrats and those in the Deep South supporting a
broader Second Amendment right and Republicans and those in the North
and West supporting a more limited public carry right. This was not uniform,
as there were notable exceptions in the South, including Tennessee,
Arkansas, and Texas, which maintained fairly strict regulations, and
108. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4506 (West 2015), invalidated by Wrenn v. District of
Columbia, 864 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
109. Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 107 F. Supp. 3d I (D.D.C.), vacated, 808 F.3d 81
(D.C. Cir. 2015).
110. Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 651.
111. Ann E. Marimow & Peter Jamison, D.C Will Not Appeal Concealed Carry Gun
Ruling to Supreme Court, WASH. POST (Oct. 5, 2017), https://perma.cc/LC6S-7VP2.
112. See D.C. CODE § 7-2509.02 (Supp. 2017).
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Connecticut and Vermont in the North, which operated under less restrictive
firearms regimes.1 1 3 Second, because Northerners and Republicans were the
primary force behind the drafting and ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, their historical tradition should be the lens through which
courts interpret and analyze the meaning of the Second Amendment as
incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment.
A. The Lack of a Clear National Consensus About the Scope of the Right
to Bear Arms Undermines Claims that the Second Amendment Protects
a Broad Right to Carry Firearms in Public.
In Heller, Justice Scalia defended the Court's decision against Justice
Stevens's dissent, stating:
Justice Stevens' view [that the Second Amendment protects a right tied to
militia service] thus relies on the proposition, unsupported by any evidence,
that different people of the founding period had vastly diferent conceptions
of the right to keep and bear arms. That simply does not comport with our
longstanding view that the Bill of Rights codified venerable, widely
understood liberties.114
What the debate surrounding the passage of the District's 1892 public carry
law clearly shows is that in the period after the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Second Amendment and its state analogues were not
"widely understood" to protect a broad right to carry in public.' 15
113. The author has discussed the Texas example in another article. See Frassetto, supra
note 20. Why Tennessee and Arkansas developed unique traditions would be an interesting
topic for future articles. The lax regulation in some Northern states creates a different set of
questions. Was their permissive regulation of carry a conscious policy choice or was public
carry simply not enough of a problem to warrant legislative action?
114. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 604-05 (2008) (emphases added).
115. Whether the relevant time period when analyzing the right as applied to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment backdates to the time of the ratification of the Second
Amendment or is analyzed at the time of the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment is an
open question in originalist methodology. See Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144
(9th Cir. 2014) (analyzing the scope of the right in 1791 but considering late nineteenth
century sources); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 702 (7th Cir. 2011) ("[T]he Second
Amendment's scope as a limitation on the States depends on how the right was understood
when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified."); see also Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E.
Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitutions When the Fourteenth Amendment Was
Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 87
TEX. L. REv. 7, 15 (2008) (looking to state constitutional rights at the time of the ratification
of the Fourteenth Amendment because of their potential relevance in understanding
unenumerated rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Privileges
and Immunities Clauses); Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause:
The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 Aluz. ST. L.J. 1085, 1099-1100 (1995)
(discussing whether the 1868 understanding of the Establishment Clause should be controlling
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Then, as now, there was a broad regional variation between what level
of weapons people were comfortable with in public spaces and how states
regulated carrying firearms in public.' 16 Many Western states prohibited
carrying guns in urban areas while broadly allowing carry on the frontier. 17
Several Southern states prohibited concealed carry while generally allowing
open carry." 8 Many Northern and a few Southern states prohibited carrying
firearms in public but included exceptions when a person faced an imminent
threat.1 9 States like Tennessee and Arkansas had idiosyncratic systems,
only allowing public carry openly and in the hand.'20 Others have noted
similar patterns in protection of the right to bear arms in state constitutions.
Fewer states in the Midwest, Northeast, and West codified a right to keep
and bear arms in their state constitutions, while a supermajority of Southern
states had Second Amendment analogues.1 2 1 With this level of variation, it
is impossible to say any conception of the Second Amendment, let alone a
conception mandating a broad right to carry firearms in public, constituted a
widely understood right.122
in Establishment Clause cases). See generally Michael D. Ramsey, Beyond the Text: Justice
Scalia's Originalism in Practice, 92 NOTRE DAvIE L. Rrv. 1945, 1968-69 (2017) (discussing
Justice Scalia's apparently contradictory opinions on this issue). The author sides with Justice
Scalia's view in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n: "I doubt that the Fourteenth
Amendment time-warped the post-Civil War States back to the Revolution." 514 U.S. 334,
375 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
116. For a detailed analysis of current public carry laws, see Gun Law Navigator,
EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY, http://every.tw/2ow20mK [https://perma.cc/T99S-PZ67].
117. See Act of Mar. 18, 1889, no. 13, 1889 Ariz. Sess. Laws 30; Act of Apr. 1, 1881, no.
96, § 1, 1881 Ark. Acts 191, 191; Act of Feb. 4, 1889, § 1, 1889 Idaho Sess. Laws 23, 23; Act
of Mar. 4, 1881, ch. 37, § 23, 1881 Kan. Sess. Laws 79, 92; Act of Jan. 29, 1869, ch. 32, § 1,
1869 N.M. Laws 72, 72; Act of Dec. 2, 1875, ch. 52, § 1, 1876 Wyo. Sess. Laws 352, 352.
118. See ALA. CODE § 3273-3275 (1852) (including an exception to concealed carry
restrictions when facing a threat); Act of June 2, 1893, ch. 4124, § 1, 1893 Fla. Laws 51, 51;
GA. CODE § 4413 (1861); Act of Mar. 22, 1871, ch. 1888, 1871 Ky. Acts 89; Act of Feb. 28,
1878, ch. 46, § 1 1878 Miss. Laws 175, 175 (including an exception to concealed carry
restriction when facing a threat); Act of Mar. 5, 1883, 1883 Mo. Laws 76; Act of Dec. 24,
1880, no. 362, § 1, 1881 S.C. Acts 447, 447-48; Act of Oct. 29, 1870, ch. 349, § 1, 1870 Va.
Acts 510, 510.
119. See ME. STAT. tit. 12, ch. 169, § 16 (1841); MASs. REV. STAT. ch. 134, § 16 (1836);
MICH. REV. STAT. ch. 162, § 16 (1846); MINN. STAT. ch1 104, § 17 (1881); OR. STAT. ch. 16,
§ 17 (1854); Act of Mar. 31, 1860, no. 375, § 6, 1860 Pa. Laws 427, 432.
120. See Act of Apr. 1, 1881, no. 96, § 2, 1881 Ark. Acts 191, 192; Act of Dec. 14, 1871,
ch. 90, § 1, 1871 Tenn. Acts 81, 81.
121. Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 115, at 29.
122. The author has argued that the Northern and Eastern tradition actually predominated,
especially in a period after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in the second half of the
nineteenth and early twentieth century. See Briefof Amicus Curiae Everytown for Gun Safety
in Support of Appellants & Reversal at 25, Grace v. District of Columbia, decided sub nom.
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That is not to say that complete unanimity is required to find a historical
understanding of a Second Amendment right.12 3 There will certainly be
cases where a predominant historical understanding of the right can be
adopted by a court applying originalism, even when there is some evidence
of disparate traditions. 12 4  Where to draw the line between a sufficient
historical record to uphold a firearm regulation and a record that is too sparse
is an open question in the courts and in the academic originalist debate.1 25
However, as the debate discussed above shows, during the period
immediately following the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, there
was clearly no broad understanding of the right to carry arms in public.
B. When Analyzing the Scope of the Right to Bear Arms, as Incorporated
in the Fourteenth Amendment, the Understanding Adopted by the
Amendment's Northern and Republican Proponents Should Carry
More Weight
As discussed above, the variation in the understanding of the right to
bear arms generally fell into regional patterns. Congressmen from Northern
states generally viewed the right as more limited, while representatives of
Southern states believed the right extended more broadly.1 26 With certain
exceptions, especially among Democrats, the distinctions also broke down
Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, (D.C. Cir. 2017) (No. 16-7067); Brief of
Amicus Curiae Everytown for Gun Safety in Support of Appellees & Affirmance at 23-27,
Wrenn, 864 F.3d 650 (No. 16-7025).
123. For a discussion of the various possibilities for burden of proof in the originalist
analysis, see Ramsey, supra note 115, at 1970-73.
124. The author has argued elsewhere that the bipartisan understanding of the right to bear
arms at the time of the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment allowed states to prohibit
the carrying of firearms except for those with an immediate need for self-defense. Frassetto,
supra note 20 (discussing the bipartisan legal consensus in Texas for upholding fairly
restrictive public carry laws in the mid-1870s).
125. See Grace v. District of Columbia, 187 F. Supp. 3d 124, 139 n.14 (D.D.C. 2016)
(requiring a "universal and long-established tradition" (internal quotations omitted)); Nat'1
Rifle Ass'n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185,
202-04 (5th Cir. 2012) (finding "a longstanding, historical tradition" of restricting firearms
possession by those under the age of twenty-one based, in part, on restrictions enacted in
nineteen states and the District of Columbia in the nineteenth century); John 0. McGinnis,
The Duty ofClarity, 84 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 843,918 (2016) (arguing that the judiciary should
strike down the actions of the other branches "only when they conflict with a meaning of the
Constitution which the judiciary finds to be clear").
126. Other research has found similar results. One survey of state constitutions found that
in 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, 73% of Southern state constitutions
had right to bear arms provisions, while only 60/o of constitutions in Northeastern states and
42% of Midwestern and Western states had Second Amendment analogues. Calabresi &
Agudo, supra note 115, at 51.
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along party lines, with Republicans generally supportive of additional
regulation and Democrats favoring fewer restrictions.12 7
To the extent one of these traditions should prevail, it is the Northern
Republican tradition of restricting public carry to those with a specific need
that should ultimately carry more weight. 12 8 Northern Republicans were
responsible for the drafting-and were the primary force behind the
ratification-of the Fourteenth Amendment. 12 9 Northern states constituted
nineteen of the twenty-seven states necessary for ratification.13 0 The
Southern states that supported ratification were compelled to provide the
necessary votes as a precondition for readmission into the Union, so it is not
clear whether their traditions should carry any weight. As a result, "we
should focus on the resonance of the Fourteenth Amendment text with
Northern legal ideas, not those that could span both North and South. To the
extent they differ from their Southern counterparts, Northern notions of
equality, civil liberty, and due process are the Fourteenth Amendment's
interpretive key." 13
Applying this standard, the Northern view that firearms could be
broadly regulated-and specifically that the carrying of firearms outside of
the home could be licensed or limited to those with a specific need-should
predominate. The Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to adopt the
Southern view of a broad, though not unlimited, right to possess firearms and
carry them in public. Courts considering Second Amendment challenges to
state concealed carry laws, generally adopted in Northern and Western states,
127. See 23 CONG. REC. 5790 (1892) (listing the roll-call vote on final passage in the
Senate); W.H. MICHAEL, OFFICIAL CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY: FIFTY-SECOND CONGRESS
(2d ed. 1892).
128. See Green, supra note 22, at 202 ("Therefore, the text of the Amendment should be
read through the lens of Northern views of equality, due process, and the privileges of citizens,
not as if the Amendment was genuinely co-authored with the South."); Calabresi & Agudo,
supra note 115, at 53-54 ("The fact that the right was such a distinctly Southern one in 1868
may also bear on whether most Americans recognized it as a fundamental right at [the time
of ratification.]").
129. See Gerard N. Magliocca, Opinion, The Father of the 14th Amendment, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 17, 2013, 12:29 PM), https://perma.cc/WT24-5VHX (discussing John Bingham's role
in the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment).
130. Christopher R. Green, The South Tried to Secede, and You'll Never Guess What
Happened Next: Loyal Denominatorism and the Fourteenth Amendment, LA. L. REV.
(forthcoming), https://perma.cc/722S-MYMG. Green supports the theory that the ratification
of a constitutional amendment only requires three-quarters of loyal states, meaning the
Fourteenth Amendment was actually ratified earlier with the support of nineteen Northern
states and Tennessee. Id
131. Green, supra note 22, at 202; see also id at 202 n.167 (noting that there were "a few
Republicans who described the Fourteenth Amendment as the export of Northern civil
liberties to the South").
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should analyze the Second Amendment through the lens of the Northern and
Republican historical tradition.
Even if one rejects the idea that Northern views should predominate
when interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, it is beyond debate that the
Amendment was not originally understood to be an effort to replace Northern
and Republican views about the scope of rights with Southern and
Democratic views. 13 2  At the time of the Fourteenth Amendment's
ratification, Northern states generally had more stringent firearms
regulations than Southern states, and no evidence in history or logic suggests
that the Northern states responsible for the Fourteenth Amendment's
ratification intended to abrogate their traditions and to nationalize the
Southern view.1 3 3
CONCLUSION
The material presented here is meant to add another piece of evidence
to the academic and judicial discussion about the original public meaning of
the Second Amendment. Obviously, no single source can be decisive in
understanding the historical scope of a right, especially the Second
Amendment, for which the historical inquiry is extremely wide-ranging.
However, a historical inquiry ranging across hundreds of years and dozens
ofjurisdictions is always in need of additional scholarship to clarify and add
needed nuance to the field.
While it certainly does not end the Second Amendment historical
debate, the history of public carry regulation in Washington, D.C. and the
debate surrounding the enactment of the District's 1892 public carry law
does foreclose certain arguments. First, in the period after ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment, there was clearly no national consensus in support
of a broad right to carry firearms in public. This defeats the argument that at
the time of ratification, or in the period afterwards, the right to keep and bear
arms was "widely understood" to protect a broad right to carry in public.
Second, consistent with the Ruben-Cornell model, it is no longer a plausible
argument to claim that distinct regional traditions did not exist. The North,
West, and South clearly had distinct constitutional traditions surrounding the
right to keep and bear arms.
More controversially, but still intuitively, these distinct regional
traditions lend further support to the view that, when applying the Second
Amendment to the states, the Northern tradition should be the lens through
which courts view the right as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment.
132. See id at 202.
133. See Ruben & Cornell, supra note 12, at 127.
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This Northern tradition, which allowed for a broad range of firearm
regulations to protect public safety, makes clear that the drafters and ratifiers
of the Fourteenth Amendment always understood firearms regulation to be
consistent with the right to bear arms.
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